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Nonrecourse Financing: Does It Still
Generate Tax Advantages After Gibson
Products Co. v. United States and
Brountas v. Commissioner?
INTRODUCTION

With the passage of the sixteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution,' the government had the authority to tax income and
to pass legislation pursuant to that objective. Since that time, all
American citizens have had to file a tax return and pay the requisite
amount of taxes. To most taxpayers, the tax laws amount to nothing
more than a complicated labyrinth. For those who are more ambitious,
and more anxious to protect their income, the tax laws offer opportunities for substantial tax savings if the tax laws are utilized to their
maximum potential.
As promulgated by Congress, the tax laws contain certain procedures which permit an astute taxpayer to minimize his tax liability.
This, in conjunction with the courts' recognition that a taxpayer may
arrange his affairs to reduce his taxes, 2 provides the taxpayer/investor
with the opportunity to protect his personal income. One such income protection device which capitalizes on the provisions provided
by Congress and the reasoning of the courts is the tax shelter.
Tax shelters can arise from a number of investment opportunities,
ranging from equipment leasing to oil and gas exploration, all of which
result in numerous tax benefits for the taxpayer. 3 One of the most
important benefits, particularly in the oil and gas tax shelter, is the
use of borrowed funds or nonrecourse financing' to increase the
number of permissible deductions that the taxpayer may claim. 5 The
1. "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever sources derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI.
2. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 293
U.S. 465 (1934); see also Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390 (1930).
3. See infra notes 14, 22 and accompanying text.
4. Nonrecourse financing is the use of borrowed funds for which the borrower is not personally liable. That is, the lender has no recourse against the borrower if the loan is in default. In contrast, in the traditional lending transaction,
the lender can seek payment directly from the borrower if the debt is in default.
See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
5. Nonrecourse notes have in the past been considered liabilities and with
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use of nonrecourse financing was severely restricted by the enactment
of section 465 of the Internal Revenue Code 6 and the decisions of
the United States Courts of Appeals in Brountas v. Commissioner'
and Gibson Products Co. v. United States.' These actions represent
affirmative steps by the legislature and the judiciary to reduce the
use of nonrecourse financing, especially in oil and gas tax shelters.
This comment will examine the concept of nonrecourse financing with a focus on three areas. First, the oil and gas tax shelter
and its reliance upon nonrecourse financing will be examined. Next,
the approaches used by the courts in Brountas and Gibson Products
to rebut the taxpayers' contention that nonrecourse notes permit greater
deductions will be addressed. These approaches are the "all events"
test, the basis analysis and a section 636 analysis. Finally, the impact
of the three analytical approaches as applied by the Brountas and
Gibson Products courts on the most recent decisions of the United
States Tax Court will be examined. Those decisions, Graf v.
Commissioner,9 Saviano v. Commissioner, and Fox v. Commissioner"
reflect the decision by the Tax Court to adopt the contingency
arguments articulated in Brountas and Gibson Products, and apply
those arguments to cases involving tax shelters other than oil and gas.
In the wake of these decisions, there exists the possibility that an
astute taxpayer may still capitalize on nonrecourse financing.
BACKGROUND

Taxpayers in the upper income brackets whose incomes are consequently subject to the greatest amount of tax," are often looking
aggressive tax planning these liabilities can permit the taxpayer to qualify for more
deductions and thereby shelter more personal income. For a more detailed explanation of how nonrecourse notes operate, see infra notes 17, 32-47 and accompanying
text.
6. I.R.C. § 465 (1976). See infra notes 121-24, 134-37 and accompanying text.
7. 73 T.C. 491 (1980), rev'd, 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982). This case was
also appealed to the Third Circuit by a different defendant, CRC Corporation, in
CRC Corp. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.. 1982), rev'g Brountas, 73 T.C.
491 (1980).
8. 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).

9. 80 T.C. 944 (1983).
10. 80 T.C. 955 (1983).
11. 80 T.C. 972 (1983).

12. Prior to 1982, the taxpayer could have had personal income taxed at a
rate as high as 70%. After 1982, however, Congress revised the tax laws limiting
the taxation of personal income to a maximum level of 50%. I.R.C. § 1 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).

It has been suggested that tax shelters would be advantageous at the following
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for ways to reduce their taxable income,' 3 or to reduce the amount
of tax they must pay. The tax shelter is one method for achieving
those goals. In the broadest sense of the term, a tax shelter is an

undertaking which can protect the personal income of a taxpayer by
generating expenses which may be deducted." Specifically, a tax shelter

is an investment opportunity' 5 which permits the upper income taxpayer to defer his tax liability with accelerated deductions,"6 use borincome levels: $60,000 if filing a joint return; $30,000 if married, but filing a separate
return; $40,000 if filing an individual return; and $44,700 if filing as the head of
the household. All of these taxpayers are taxed at a rate of at least 49%. See R.
SWANSON & B. SWANSON, TAX SHELTERS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS AND THEIR ADVISORS 26 (1982).
13. Taxable income means exactly what it says-the amount of income upon
which the taxpayer is required to pay a tax. This figure is calculated by taking gross
income as defined in § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, minus the permissible deductions, plus any available tax credits to arrive at taxable income. I.R.C. §§ 61, 63(b)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
14. The tax shelter is an extremely important tool for the upper income taxpayer since it permits him to "shelter" his ordinary income from taxation by legally
reducing his tax liability with deductions and losses incurred from the tax shelter.
Although this comment discusses tax shelters in the field of oil and gas exploration
and development, there exist a number of other investment opportunities that can
act as tax shelters. These include real estate ventures, which generate deductions for
interest and depreciation; equipment leasing, which generates deductions for accelerated
depreciation and investment tax credits; timber tax shelters, which generate a deduction for depletion; farming, which generates both investment tax credits and deductions for depreciation; motion picture tax shelters, which generate a number of
accelerated deductions through the use of borrowed funds; and finally, art tax shelters,
which generate deductions for interest and at a later date generate favorable capital
gains treatment. See Hipple, Non-Real Estate Tax Shelters, 25 TAX CoNF. Wm. &
MARY C. 89, 90-91 (1978).

15. See A. ARNOLD, TAX SHELTER IN REAL ESTATE UNDER THE TAX REFORM
1976, at 5 (1977); see also R. HAFT & P. FASS, 4 TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS

ACT OF

3-5 (1981).
16. A taxpayer can defer some of his tax liability by entering investment
opportunities which permit the taxpayer to take deductions in the initial years of
the investment. In some shelters, the investor can take numerous deductions in the
first year of the investment. For example, in an oil and gas shelter, intangible drilling costs may be deducted. See infra note 41. These deductions are said to be accelerated in that they are not spread over the life of the investment. The taxpayer
is effectively using the deductions and losses of the shelter in the years when the
shelter investment is generating no income. When the investment begins to show a
profit (or at the expiration of the first year in the case of the intangible drilling
costs), the accelerated deduction aspect of the shelter becomes less important to the

investor. See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 95TH
CONc., IST SESS., OVERVIEW OF TAX SHELTERS 2 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter
cited as OVERVIEW OF TAX SHELTERS]; see also R. Sripmo, TAX SHELTERS (1983);
A. ARNOLD, supra note 15, at 5-6.
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rowed funds to increase basis,' 7 and convert ordinary income into
capital gains.'" Utilizing the tax shelter to its full potential, the taxpayer can successfully shelter his ordinary income with deductions
and losses and reduce the amount of tax paid. The sheltering process
is illustrated by the following example.

Investor A enters an investment opportunity which requires
$200,000 in capital, but he can only supply one-eighth or $25,000
personally. The additional $175,000 must be borrowed. Although the
funds are borrowed, A is still able to claim, for tax purposes, that
his investment is equivalent to $200,000. If the investment generates

$75,000 of deductions during that year, A, who is in the fifty percent
tax bracket, could reduce his tax liability by $37,500 ($75,000 x .5
=$37,500). When A does his tax accounting, he has a deduction of
$75,000, which is $50,000 greater than the amount of capital that

he personally invested, and will have created an overall tax savings
of $12,500 ($37,500-$25,000).'

9

If A should decide to sell the assets2"

17. The taxpayer may or may not be personally liable for the borrowed funds.
In this comment the term "borrowed funds" will refer only to the use of nonrecourse
financing by the taxpayer.
One of the most effective ways for a taxpayer to shelter his income and reduce
his risks is through the use of nonrecourse financing. The borrowed funds are important to the taxpayer in two respects. First, he is able to limit the amount of
personal funds that must be expended and can utilize these in other ventures. Second,
the borrowed funds are treated, for tax purposes, as if they were part of the taxpayer's own contributions; therefore, the taxpayer has a greater investment in the
tax shelter. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. This allows the taxpayer
to capitalize on a greater number of the tax advantages generated by the shelter.

See OVERVIEW

OF

TAX

SHELTERS,

supra note 16, at 3;

STAFF

OF JOINT COMMITTEE

SEss., TAX SHELTERS: OIL AND
GAS DRILLING FUNDS 2 (Comm. Print 1975); see also A. ARNOLD, supra note 15,
at 5-6; R. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 9; infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
18. A taxpayer can even shelter his income by disposing of his capital assets
belonging to the shelter investment. When the asset is sold by the tax shelter vehicle,
perhaps a partnership, for an amount greater than its basis, there is a taxable gain
on the transaction. If that gain qualifies under § 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code,
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,

94TH CONG.,

IST

it is taxed at the capital gains rate which is lower than the personal income rate.
I.R.C. § 1231 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The end result is less taxes paid by the investor. See OVERVIEW OF TAX SHELTER, supra note 16, at 3-4; R. SHAPIRO, supra

note 16, at 210.
19. It is contended that A can reduce his tax liability by $37,500 because that
is A's tax rate multiplied by the amount of deductions available to A. The $37,500

represents the actual tax benefit that the $75,000 deduction gives to A. By comparing the $37,500 to A's capital contribution of $25,000, the overall tax savings that
A has obtained by investing in a tax shelter are seen. The savings described in this
example are intentionally exaggerated, but serve to emphasize the possible tax
advantages of the shelter. See A. ARNOLD, supra note 15, at 6.
20. The assets that A sells must be capital assets in order for A to shelter
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of the investment, he may receive additional tax benefits by converting the sale into capital gains and thus further reducing his tax
liability. 1 The tax shelter benefits, illustrated above, are present in
many different investment opportunities; however, during the early
1970's the oil and gas development tax shelter was especially popular.2 2
The typical oil and gas tax shelter23 is based on a limited
partnership"' established for the sole purpose of oil exploration and
development. Faced with the option of investing as either a limited

or general partner,"5 most investors choose to be limited partners,

his ordinary income by being taxed at the capital gains rate. See supra note 18.
21. See supra note 18.
22. At that time there were numerous advantages to the oil and gas tax shelter:
1) intangible drilling costs were deductible in the year incurred; 2) capital assets were
depreciable; 3) cost of dry holes was deductible; 4) income from oil and gas investments was reducible by a depletion allowance; and 5) drilling program interest
was exchangeable for common stock in oil companies in a tax-free transaction. These
advantages, coupled with the fact that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 had severely
restricted tax shelters in commercial real estate, farming and ranching, and equipment leasing, made the oil and gas tax shelter extremely popular. Smith, Tax Sheltered
Investments: Oil and Gas v. Real Estate, 56 MAss. L.Q. 400, 401 (1971). See generally
G. SILBERT, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS 161-226 (1973) (general overview of the
oil and gas tax shelter).
23. Although the cases in this comment refer only to oil production, the tax
shelter deals with oil and gas because both may be located in the same or similar
geological formations and both may be discovered when making the exploratory drills.
R. SWANSON & B. SWANSON, supra note 12, at 170.
24. A partnership is "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other incorporated organization, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title,
a trust or estate or a corporation." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1976).
The type of partnerships that are most often utilized in an oil and gas tax
shelter are limited partnerships which are:
partnerships formed by two or more persons under the provisions of Section 2 (listing all necessary requirements for a limited partnership] having
as members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partners as such should not be bound to the obligations
of the partnership.
UNIF. LIM. PART. ACT § 1 (1916).

25. In a typical limited partnership for oil and gas exploration, the distinction
between the partners is fairly well-defined. The general partners, for the most part,
are few in number and are in charge of partnership management. This includes purchasing the leasehold for the partnership, in addition to securing the investments
of numerous limited partners so as to accumulate the requisite amount of funds
needed to purchase the leaseholds. The limited partner is the basic contributor of
capital and has the ability to receive a greater short-term benefit, with a small capital
investment, through the deduction of intangible drilling costs. The limited partner
is, however, subject to the greatest amount of risk since he has no voice in the management. The general partners may decide to discontinue the drilling operations on some
leaseholds which may jeopardize the tax advantages of the limited partner. See A.
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for although it restricts their voice in partnership management, it ensures limited liability and often times guarantees the accessibility of
increased deductions.26 The increased deductions, coupled with a limited
capital investment, are the main attraction in the first year of the
oil and gas tax investment, but other tax benefits become available
in subsequent years.2"
Normally, the taxpayer contributes a lump sum to the partnership which is used to purchase oil and gas leaseholds. This contribution represents the taxpayer's basis in the partnership.2 8 This basis
can be increased either by additional cash contributions 9 or by the
ROSENBERG, EVALUATING TAX SHELTER OFFERINGS

1983, at 408 (1983); see also Levy

& Tucker, Financing Oil and Gas Development Through Limited PartnershipsHow to Make the Federal Income Taxes Work for You, 22 OIL & GAS TAX Q.
1 (1973). See generally J. BIERMAN, ThE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AS AN INVESTMENT

(1974) (providing a general overview of the use of the limited partnership
and its advantages and disadvantages); REV. UNIF. Li. PART. ACT § 101(5)(6) (1976).
26. A limited partner is usually entitled to all deductions for intangible drilling
costs under I.R.C. § 263. This is usually made possible with the help of a functional
allocation agreement which permits the partners to determine the distributive shares
of partnership profits and losses. I.R.C. § 704(c)(2) (1976). In most oil and gas tax
shelters the functional allocation agreement provides for the limited partners to take
VEHICLE

the intangible drilling cost deductions. The rationale behind this is that the capital
contribution of the limited partners is used to purchase the items from which the
deductions result; hence it is equitable that the limited partners receive the deductions they made possible. The general partners' capital contributions can be invested
in tangible property which can be depreciated. These are the deductions which flow
to the general partners.
Nonetheless, the limited partners are not always receiving the most for their
money in that type of functional allocation system. Normally the intangible drilling
costs are only deductible in the first year of the investment. See infra note 41. On
the other hand, the depreciation deductions are available for the life of the property.
Also, if the partnership decides not to complete a well, the limited partner may be
left without any intangible deductions, while the general partner still has the depreciable
assets. See R. SWANSON & B. SWANSON, supra note 12, at 16; see also R. HAFT
& P. FASs, 1983 TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS HANDBOOK 267 (1983); Harrel &
Stricoff, Overview of Oil and Gas Tax Shelters, 28 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 496 (1980).
27. This comment deals with the deduction of intangible drilling costs made
possible through the use of borrowed funds. That, however, is only one of the benefits
of the oil and gas tax shelter. Other benefits include accelerated depreciation, abandonment losses, depletion allowances and investment tax credits. All of these offer
the taxpayer losses and deductions that go beyond the first year of the investment.
See Harrel & Stricoff, supra note 26, at 409-11.
28. A taxpayer's basis in the partnership would consist of any money contributed and/or the adjusted basis of any property contributed, if the partner chose
to contribute property rather than cash. I.R.C. § 722 (1976).

29. I.R.C. § 705(a)(1) (1976); see also Treas. Reg. 1.705-1(a)(2) (1960) (basis
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liabilities of the partnership for which the partner is responsible.30

A higher basis in the partnership is extremely important to the taxpayer/investor because the greater his share of the partnership, the
greater his permissible deductions. 3'
The mechanics, as well as further details, of the tax shelter process can best be understood by considering a working example of an
oil and gas partnership as was presented in Gibson Products Co. v.
United States.32 Gibson, the taxpayer/defendant, was a limited partner in the McNeil Street Drilling Venture with an initial investment
of $25,000 (8.06% of the total capital).33 With the capital investments
of all the limited partners, McNeil was able to purchase five oil
leaseholds. After acquiring the sites, it was necessary to secure
another firm to do the actual exploratory drilling, since the McNeil
partnership did not possess the requisite capital to finance such an
operation. The partnership entered into a "no-out turnkey drilling"
increased by additional capital contributions of the partner).
30. Section 752(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "Any increase in
a partner's share of liabilities of a partnership, or any increases in a partner's individual liabilities, shall be considered a contribution of money by such a partner
to the partnership." I.R.C. § 752(a) (1976). See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying
text.
31. Levy & Tucker, supra note 25, at 38.
32. 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981). It is informative to compare the facts of
the Gibson Prods. case with those in Brountas, 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982). In the
Brountas case, Brountas was a limited partner and CRC Corp. was both a limited
and a general partner. CRC Corp. was responsible for securing the oil leaseholds
for the partnership and also for securing the necessary capital to purchase those
leases. The capital contributions of Brountas were $10,000 in 1972 and $1000 in
1973, while CRC Corp. made two contributions of $25,000 in 1972 and two of
$2500 in 1973. With this contributed capital, the partnership was able to purchase
five leaseholds. The partnership, named Coral I, then entered into a no-out turnkey
drilling contract to have exploratory wells drilled on its leaseholds. See infra note
34. The contract called for 40% to be paid in cash and 60% to be satisfied by a
nonrecourse note. The partnership's collateral for the nonrecourse note consisted of
a percentage of future profits, the drilling equipment and the leaseholds. The drilling company secured by Coral I was subject to all the risks, making this a safe investment for the partnership.
Due to the intangible drilling costs incurred by the partnership, Brountas claimed
deductions of $18,919 in 1972 and $1882 in 1973. CRC Corp. claimed two deductions in 1972, one for $47,294 and the other for $49,259; in 1973 they claimed deductions of $4705 and $4737. Of these amounts, the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue disallowed $13,031 for Brountas and $62,676 for CRC Corp. The Internal
Revenue Service argued that the notes were shams. Atlditionally, the Commissioner
argued that even if the notes were not shams, they did not qualify as liabilities under
§ 752 or as production payments under § 636. 73 T.C. at 493-534.
33. 637 F.2d at 1043.
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contract ' with a drilling company, Galaxy Oil. The terms of the contract required that forty percent of the contract price be paid in cash
and sixty percent to be in the form of a nonrecourse note." The note
36
had a five-year life and paid interest of six and one-half percent.
The collateral for the note consisted of the five leases, the equipment
and an option for eighty percent of the future profits if the well proved
to be successful. 3 7 If, however, the well were dry, the taxpayer/investor would not be held personally liable for the note and the drilling company could look only to the note's collateral for payment.
Gibson believed his basis in the partnership could be increased
by his pro rata share of the note, since the note represented a liability to the partnership. Although Code section 752(a) states that a partner must be personally liable before his basis can increase,3" Treasury
Regulation section 1.752-1 permits the nonrecourse note to be included
in calculating the basis.39 The regulation directs that when no one
partner is liable, all partners share the liability for the note in accordance with their percentage of capital contributions. Accordingly, Gibson increased his basis from $25,000 to $56,403 by adding his share
of the liability for the nonrecourse note. 0
During the first year of Gibson's investment the McNeil partnership incurred intangible drilling costs (IDC) of $611,535. Section 263
of the Internal Revenue Code allows the taxpayer to deduct the total
amount of his IDC's. 4 ' However, this deduction is limited to an
34. Such a contract has been defined as "a contract whereunder a drilling contractor undertakes to furnish all materials and labor, and to perform all the work
necessary to drill and complete a well in a workmanlike manner, place it in production and turn it over to the operator for a specified price." R. HAFT & P. FASS,
supra note 26, at 275. The name "turnkey" is derived from the drilling contractor
turning the key of ownership over to the oil and gas partnership after the well is
completed. See R. SWANSON & B. SWANSON, supra note 12, at 174.
35. 637 F.2d at 1043.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 30 (any increase in a partner's individual liabilities is considered a monetary contribution).
39. However, where none of the partners have any personal liability with respect
to a partnership liability (as in the case of a mortgage on real estate acquired by
a partnership without the assumption by the partnership or any of the partners of
any liability on the mortgage), then all partners, including the limited partner, shall
be considered liable under § 752(c) in the same proportion as they share profits.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960).
40. 637 F.2d at 1044. See generally Levy & Tucker, supra note 25, at 38-40;
R. SHAPIRO, supra note 16; Harrel & Stricoff, supra note 26, at 500.
41. Section 263 of the Internal Revenue Code permits the Secretary of the
Treasury to prescribe the regulations that will make a deduction for oil and gas in-
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amount which does not exceed the taxpayer's basis.4 2 Gibson was eligible to deduct $49,289 as an IDC on his tax return. By tax accounting

in this manner, Gibson would have received a potential deduction
which was $24,000 greater than his initial investment.
At this point, the Internal Revenue intervened to limit Gibson's
permissible deductions to $25,000, arguing that that was his basis in
the partnership.4 3 The position of the Internal Revenue Service was
that nonrecourse notes could not be used to increase the basis, since
such an action would give the taxpayer an unwarranted windfall. The
Service contended that since the drilling company had no recourse
against the taxpayer should the well prove to be dry, the taxpayer
did not have a liability that necessitated the application of section
752 and the consequent increase in basis.4"
Faced with the possibility -of losing the benefits generated by
nonrecourse financing, many taxpayers look to section 636 of the Internal Revenue Code for an alternative theory to show that the note

is a liability and therefore includible in the basis.

5

Section 636 discusses

the concept of production payments and explains that such payments

are to be treated as mortgage loans.

6

If treated as a mortgage loan,

the note would again be considered a liability of the partnership and
tangible drilling costs a permissible deduction. I.R.C. § 263(c) (1976). That section,
however, does not define what an intangible drilling cost is. For the purposes of
this paper the following definition will be adopted: an IDC is "any cost which itself
has no salvage value and which is incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells
and the preparation of wells for the production of oil and gas." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.612-4(a) (1956). This definition would specifically include amounts paid for supplies, labor, services, fuel, repairs and hauling expenses. But see Rev. Rul. 74-414,
1970-2 C.B. 132 (explaining that items which do not have a salvage value are not
considered IDC's); see also Keller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 5 (1982) (attempting
to establish some criteria for identifying a deductible IDC).
42. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1976) (partnership's loss deduction is limited to the partners' adjusted basis in the partnership).
43. 460 F. Supp. at 1113.
44. 637 F.2d at 1049 (quoting Brountas, 73 T.C. at 559).
45. See, e.g., Brountas, 73 T.C. at 556. If the nonrecourse note is not a liability
under § 752 and therefore not included in the basis, the amount of IDC's the partner may deduct is limited. The taxpayer needs to have the nonrecourse notes treated
as a liability so that he can increase his basis. See supra note 30. The defendant,
Brountas, contended that § 636 of the Internal Revenue Code, read in conjunction
with the corresponding Treasury regulations, could provide the taxpayer with a viable
solution to his dilemma. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
46. As defined by the Treasury regulations, a production payment is: "a right
to a specified share of the production from mineral in place (if, as, and when produced), or proceeds from such production." Treas. Reg. § 636-1(a), T.D. 7261, 1973-1
C.B. 309. The regulations further require that: "[sluch right must be an economic
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be includible in the partner's basis under sections 705 and 752." The
taxpayer, however, has the burden of proving that these notes are
production payments and thus deserving of section 636 treatment.
Prior to the enactment of section 465, in 1976, the decision to
treat a nonrecourse note as a liability had been the responsibility of
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service and the courts.
The Commissioner and the courts relied upon two analytical
approaches in making their determination: the "all events" test and
the basis analysis. The "all events" test concentrated on whether or
not a liability could be accrued, while the basis analysis sought to
determine whether a taxpayer's basis could be increased by the liability.
With the recent decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals in
Brountas and Gibson Products, there is now a third analytical approach available which can be specifically applied to oil and gas tax
shelters. This approach involves a construction of section 636 by which
nonrecourse notes are characterized as production payments. An
examination of these analytical approaches will show how the courts
have eliminated, in most cases, the use of nonrecourse financing and
its benefits.
"ALL EVENTS"

TEST

48
The "all events" test as articulated in United States v. Anderson
limits the deductions of an accrual based taxpayer4 9 to "items in the
year in which all events necessary to determine both the fact and the
amount of the liability have occurred." 5 When the test is stated in

interest in the mineral in place." Id. This economic interest cannot be satisfied from
sources other than the production of the mineral. Id.

Once an item qualifies as a production payment under Treas. Reg. 1.636-1(a),
§ 636 provides that the production payment should be treated as a mortgage loan.
I.R.C. § 636(a) (1976).

47. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
48. 269 U.S. 422 (1926); see also Subscriptions Television, Inc. v. Commissioner, 532 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1976); Lawyers' Title Guar. Fund v. United States,
508 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975).
49. An accrual based taxpayer is one whose income is reported when earned
even though it may not have been actually or constructively received. Deductions
for credits are allowed in the year that they are accrued or incurred, unless properly

allowable in another year. 4 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)

2769.025 (1983).

50. Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1046 (citing Anderson, 269 U.S. at 441). The
applicable Treasury regulations state:
Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive
such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable
accuracy. Under such a method, deductions are allowable for the taxable
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this manner, it is apparent that before a liability can give rise to deductions, the liability must be accruable, a status it can attain only if
it meets the following two requirements. First, the taxpayer must show
that the liability does in fact exist, and second, that the liability is
of an amount that is readily ascertainable. 5 The events which show
that the liability meets these requirements must all occur in the year
that the liability is to appear on the tax return. If the liability cannot be accrued, the benefits that the liability (e.g., nonrecourse notes)
has created for the taxpayer are lost.
In determining whether or not a liability constitutes a valid debt,
the courts normally look to the contingent nature of the liability. A
liability will not accrue as long as it remains contingent. 2 That is,
if a liability is dependent upon some event which may not take place
in the year the tax return is filed, the courts have determined that
the liability is too speculative to accrue. 3 An example of such a liability
is a royalty payment on a recording contract which is based on the
number of records sold.5" In such a case, the liability would arise
only if a predetermined number of records were sold. Should that
amount not be sold in the year the liability was to be reported on
the tax return, no liability could be accrued. 5 On the other hand,
if the liability were not contingent on some future happening, then
the liability would represent a valid debt and the courts would have
to look to the second requirement of the "all events" test. 6
To pass the "all events" test, a liability must not only be a valid
debt, but must also be of an ascertainable amount.5 7 The exact amount
of the liability does not have to be known,58 but the taxpayer must
year in which all the events have occurred which establish the fact of the
liability giving rise to such deductions and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy.
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163.
51. Anderson, 269 U.S. at 438, 441.
52. See Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 200 (1933).

53. See, e.g., Trinity Constr. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1970)

(employer's costs and corresponding deductions for employees' life insurance premiums
held to be contingent on number of employees alive at future due date and hence
disallowed).
54. See, e.g., ABKCO Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, 482 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.
1973); see also 4 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) 1 2907.261 (1983).
55. ABKCO, 482 F.2d at 152.
56. See, e.g., Lawyers' Title Guar. Fund v. United States, 508 F.2d 1, 5-6
(5th Cir. 1975).
57. Anderson, 269 U.S. at 441; see also supra note 50.
58. See 4 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 2906 (1983) (referring to Treas.

Reg. § 1.461-1(a)); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1960).
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be able to show that the amount of the liability can be computed
with a reasonable degree of accuracy." This criterion has been further
relaxed by one court, which required only that the taxpayer have the
ability to make a reasonably approximate estimate, provided that
estimate is based on facts occurring in the same year as the tax return.6"
Nonetheless, if the amount of the liability is contingent on some future
6
happening, then the liability cannot be accured. '
The requirements of the "all events" test pose a difficult problem for the oil and gas tax shelters, since payment of the nonrecourse
notes is usually reliant upon the future profits of the wells. 2 Payment on the note is due only if the well actually produces oil; if no
oil is produced, no liability arises to the partnership.6 3 Therefore, a
valid debt exists only if the well is a producer. This can not be determined until the wells have been drilled, which may not be in the same
year the tax return is filed. Thus the taxpayer may be unable to determine whether the well is a producer in the year the debt is incurred.
In both Gibson Products and Brountas the wells were not completed
in the year the taxpayer attempted to accrue the liability." Since all
59. See 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CODE COMMEN446:2a (1974).
60. Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951).
61. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Gibson Prods., 460 F. Supp. 1109, 1113-14 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(court indicated that if a note or liability is too speculative or contingent, that contingency in the year of the tax return prevents accrual).
In Sunburst Oil Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 829 (1931), the taxpayer's liability under a drilling contract for the expenses of drilling and operating
a well were held not accruable since the contract was to be satisfied solely from
the production of the wells. The court concluded that since payments were to be
based on future profits, the liability was too contingent to accrue. See also 2 J.
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
12.91, at 363 (1974).
63. See, Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1046-47. The Fifth Circuit found that the
evidence presented sustained a finding that future events would trigger any possible
partnership liability. It was possible that none of the wells would be productive and
the partnership would be no more liable than before it had entered the turnkey drilling contract. Even with the aid of geological studies the investors could never be
sure which wells would be productive and which would not. See infra note 70 for
statistics from the Brountas investment relating to the number of productive wells.
64. Although the district court in Gibson Prods. did not expressly state that
all the wells were not completed in the year the return was filed, this may be inferred from the court's subsequent application of the "all events" test. Additional
evidence to support this assumption comes from looking at the date on which the
note was consummated: December 29, 1972. It would not have been possible to complete the drilling of all the wells prior to January 1, 1973, so that both the making
of the note and the drilling would occur in the same year. Gibson Prods., 460 F.
Supp. at 1112.
TARY
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events, the making of the note and the drilling of the wells, did not
occur in the same year, the "all events" test prohibited the accrual
of the liability.
In addition to the contingent nature of the notes, the Fifth Circuit in Gibson Products found another reason for not considering
the nonrecourse note a valid debt. The court determined that the note
lacked the qualities of a true loan and consequently should not be
treated as a liability of the partnership."5 In reaching this conclusion
the court found that in a true lending transaction there exists a
likelihood that: 1) in light of all reasonably foreseeable risks the lender
will be repaid; 2) the borrower will have sufficient assets to cover
the full amount of the loan; and 3) the lender will only receive payment for funds advanced plus a reasonable amount of interest." The
transaction between the partnership and the drilling company was void
of these qualities. The loan was only to be repaid if the well produced oil. Additionally, the partnership did not possess sufficient assets
to cover the amount of the note and, unlike a true loan, the drilling
company could potentially receive not only six and one-half percent
interest, but also eighty percent of the future profits.' 7 The court
reasoned that under these circumstances the note could not be considered a true loan and therefore should not be accrued as a liability.6 8
Even if the nonrecourse note had constituted a valid debt, the
note would not have met the second requirement of the "all events"
test that the amount of the liability be readily ascertainable. The terms
of the turnkey drilling contract called for sixty percent of the cost
of drilling the exploratory wells to be covered by the note.69 This
amount appears to be readily ascertainable. However, the amount is
only ascertainable if all the wells produce oil and the full amount
of the note comes due." If all the wells are not productive, then it
65. Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1047.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1048.
68. Id. at 1049. The district court in Gibson Prods. found that the funds provided by the Galaxy Oil drilling company did not represent a valid debt but were,
in reality, an equity interest. Three factors were found to be significant: 1) the
initial cash outlay for the drilling obligations approximated Galaxy's own estimated
out-of-pocket costs; 2) the principal security for the debt was to be the future oil
and gas production from drilling the wells; 3) Galaxy had the right under the loan
agreement to enter into a joint venture with the partnership for the completion of
a well. Gibson Prods., 460 F. Supp. at 1119. Cf. Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972-2 C.B.
394 (similar fact pattern in an oil and gas partnership was determined by the Internal Revenue Service to represent an equity interest rather than a debt).
69. Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1043; Brountas, 692 F.2d at 154.
70. The Tax Court in Brountas found that of the 24 packages of oil wells,
11 were dry. The other 13 wells proved to be very successful and had provided a
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is uncertain how much of the note the partnership will have to pay.

The contingent nature of the note prevents the computation of the

amount of liability and results in the note failing the second require-

ment of the "all events" test.

The importance attached to the "all events" test as applied by

the First and Fifth Circuits is varied at best. The test was the crux

of the court's analysis in Gibson Products.' The First Circuit in Brountas, although citing the Gibson Products discussion of the test and
adopting its basic language, treated the "all events" test as merely
an alternative approach to its section 636 analysis. 2 Both courts,
however, recognized the importance of the contingency aspect of the
"all events" test.
BASIS ANALYSIS

The second analytical approach used by the Brountas and Gibson Products courts addressed the taxpayer's contention that
nonrecourse notes are liabilities which should increase a partner's basis
under section 752. This approach first considers whether the liability
is too contingent to increase basis,"3 and then, if it is not overly conhealthy profit for investors. 73 T.C. at 506. Despite the productivity and profitability of the wells, the fact that these results were not available when the tax return
was filed forced the nonrecourse notes to be treated as too contingent to accrue.
71. The district court listed the "all events" test as one of the two tests it
would use to rebut the taxpayer's argument. Gibson Prods., 460 F. Supp. at 1113.
The Fifth Circuit chose to adopt the "all events" test instead of the basis analysis
involved in the Crane doctrine. Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1044-45.
72. The reasoning behind the different uses of the "all events" test is twofold. First, the Tax Court in Brountas, although aware the test existed, concluded
that the applicability of § 636 and the production payment analysis precluded the
application of any other code section. This decision made it unnecessary to determine whether the note was contingent. 73 T.C. at 558; see also infra note 101.
A second rationale is the limited nature of the test. The "all events" test can
only be applied to accrual based taxpayers. See supra notes 49-50. For a cash basis
taxpayer, the test is meaningless. Gibson Prods., 460 F. Supp. at 1115 n.8. Although
the test does provide the courts with an opportunity to examine the contingent nature
of the nonrecourse note, that same examination occurs under a basis analysis and
provides a more comprehensive approach to nonrecourse financing. See infra note
73 and accompanying text.
73. See Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1266
(Ct. Cl. 1974); Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367 (1969); Columbus Greenville
Ry. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 834 (1964); Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner,
40 T.C. 831 (1963); Lloyd H. Redford, 28 T.C. 773 (1957); see also Rev. Rul. 55-675,
1955-2 C.B. 567.
The proposition that contingent liabilities cannot be used to increase basis
originated in the Redford case where the Tax Court would not permit a note given
in partial payment for the purchase price of property to be included in the prop-
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tingent, what the value of the note is in relation to the property to
which it attaches."' Evidence showing the contingent nature of nonrecourse notes in oil and gas shelters presented as part of the discussion of the "all events" test is equally persuasive here."
The second step of basis analysis considers the value of the
nonrecourse note. Emphasis on the value of a nonrecourse note was
first postulated by the United States Supreme Court in Crane v.
Commissioner.16 In that case, the Court held that a mortgage loan
for which the taxpayer was not personally liable (as nonrecourse financing) should be included in the taxpayer's basis for that property.77
The Court's holding, however, was limited to notes secured by property whose value was greater than or equal to the amount of the note."
The Crane Court did not consider the situation presented when the
value of the note was greater than the value of the property. 9
In the years following the Crane decision the courts, the Internal
Revenue Service, and Congress attempted to articulate when the
nonrecourse notes would increase basis and what value those notes
would have.8" With respect to partnership basis, Congress provided
section 752, which establishes that liabilities can be used to increase
basis.
erty's basis, since the note was to be paid from future profits. 28 T.C. at 778. This
concept was extended in Albany Car Wheel Co. where the Tax Court refused to
allow a taxpayer to include in his basis a liability for severance pay. The rationale
was that the taxpayer did not know exactly how many employees would be working
at the plant when it closed. 40 T.C. at 841. See generally Del Cotto, Basis and Amount
Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1969); Landis, Liabilities and Purchase Price, 27 TAX. LAW.
67 (1973) (Both articles review the cases dealing with contingent liabilities and their
ability or inability to increase basis, with special emphasis on Albany Car Wheel
Co. and Columbus Greenville Ry.).
74. See Tannenbaum, Leverage Shelter Operation: Oil and Gas, Motion Pictures, and Other Theatrical Shelters, 31 INST. ON FED. TAX'N. 777, 780 (1973).

75. See supra text accompanying notes 48-64 for a general discussion of the
contingency of nonrecourse notes.
76. 331 U.S. 1 (1946).
77. Id. at 12-14.
78. Id.at 14.
79. Id. at 14 n.37. In contrast, this was the problem confronting the courts
in Brountas and Gibson Prods. See generally Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of The Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX. L.

REv. 159 (1966) (an attempt to answer many of the questions left open by the Supreme
Court in Crane and the problem presented in footnote 37); Bittker, Tax Shelters,
Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX. L. REv. 277 (1978); Newman, The
Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 1 (1982).
80. An in-depth study of the subsequent history of the Crane case is beyond
the scope of this comment. Much of the difficulty and confusion concerning Crane
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Specifically, section 752(a) provides that a partner's basis can be
increased through the use of liabilities." Section 752(c) indicates,
however, that the basis can only be increased to the extent that the
nonrecourse note equals the fair market value of the property. This
suggests that if a $2000 note is secured by property with a fair market
value of $1500, the taxpayer can only increase his basis by $1500,

the amount of the liability which section 752(c) recognizes. Since the
fair market value of the property is less than the value of the note,
the taxpayer may only use the lesser amount to increase his basis.
Hence, at least in relation to the liabilities of partnerships, section
752(c) seems to have answered the problem left open by the Crane
Court.8"

Recently the United States Supreme Court was presented with
a situation in which the value of the note, in this case a mortgage,
was greater than the value of the property.' Although in dicta the
Court said the fair market value rule was irrelevant to basis and that
all nonrecourse liabilities increased basis,8" the holding suggested that
the fair market value rule is still applicable.8
Application of the second step of this analytical approach to oil
and gas partnerships has not been consistent. The district court in
Gibson Products determined that the Crane decision and section 752(c)
stems from the interplay between the property's basis and the amount realized by
the taxpayer when the property is later disposed. This, however, is not the problem
posed in Gibson Prods. and Brountas; these cases involve only basis problems. For
a more in-depth study of Crane, see Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of

Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1498 (1982); Perry, Limited Partnershipand
Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX. L. REV. 525 (1972); see also
Adams, supra note 79; Bittker, supra note 79; Del Cotto, supra note 73.
81. See supra note 30.
82. Section 752(c) provides that "for the purposes of this section, a liability
to which property is subject shall to the extent of the fair market value of such
property, be considered a liability of the owner of the property." I.R.C. § 752(c)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(c) (1960); Rev. Rul. 77-110,
1977-1 C.B. 7 (discussing the contingency of a note and its value in the context
of a motion picture tax shelter).
83. The problem posed with respect to increasing the partnership basis for tax
shelter purposes is just one segment of the Crane doctrine. The alleged answer of
§ 752(c) does not solve all the valuation problems raised by Crane. See supra note 80.
84. Tufts v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
85. 103 S. Ct. at 1831 ("that the amount of the loan exceeds the FMV of
the property thus becomes irrelevant").
86. The Tufts case involved the sale of property and was concerned with the
amount realized on the disposition of that property. In reaching its conclusion, the
Supreme Court found the fair market value rule of § 752(c) was applicable to § 752(a)
and (b), but not applicable to § 752(d). This reaffirms the conclusions put forth
by the district court in Gibson Prods. See infra text accompanying note 87.
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undermined the taxpayer's argument that his basis should

be

increased. 7 On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit limited its basis
analysis to the contingency of the note. Consideration of the value
of the note and any Crane implications was relegated to a footnote

rather than discussed in the text of the opinion. The Fifth Circuit
explained that, although they found the district court's argument per-

suasive, they were unwilling to adopt it.88

The taxpayer in Brountas also argued that Crane permitted him to

increase his basis by the value of the note. While both the Tax Court
and the First Circuit utilized a basis analysis, each followed a different line of reasoning. The Tax Court held that Brountas' reading

of Crane was correct and hence Brountas should be allowed to in-

crease his basis.8 9 The First Circuit disagreed. Nonetheless, rather than
examining the Tax Court's interpretation of Crane and section 752,

the First Circuit concluded that the contingent nature of the notes
prevented their use to increase basis.9"

The courts in Brountas and Gibson Products were willing to utilize
the first requirement of basis analysis, thereby prohibiting the taxpayer from increasing his basis if the liability were too contingent.
Neither the First nor the Fifth Circuit, however, was willing to apply

the comparative value concept of the basis analysis. There are two
possible explanations for their analysis. First, once the courts had

concluded that the notes were contingent, arguably there was no need
to discuss the second requirement of basis analysis. 9 ' Second, as indicated by the Tax Court in Brountas, the fair market value of the property was of little consequence when deciding to increase basis.92 Hence
Brountas provided additional confusion as to just how far the Crane
holding could be extended.9 3 By refusing to go beyond the contingen87. Gibson Prods., 460 F. Supp. at 1117.
88. Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1045 n.8 (suggestion that the Tufts case was
not applicable because it was concerned with the amount realized on a disposition
of property rather than with the taxpayer's basis).
89. Brountas, 73 T.C. at 570-74.
90. Brountas, 692 F.2d at 157.
91. See, e.g., id. at 157; see also supra text accompanying notes 52-61 and 73-75.
92. The fair market value of the property was of little consequence to the Tax
Court in Brountas because of the court's interpretation of § 752(c). The court reasoned
that the fair market value of the property was important to the partnership in only
two situations: when the partners contributed property or when the partnership
distributed property. Since Brountas involved neither of these situations, it was not
necessary for the court to consider the fair market value of the property. Authority
for this proposition was the legislative history of § 752 and the court's decision in
Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978). Brountas, 73 T.C. at 571-73.
93. The problems and confusion that surround the Crane decision and the
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cy argument, the First and Fifth Circuit courts may have left a void
in the basis analysis, particularly where the taxpayer can show that
94
the nonrecourse notes are not contingent.
SECTION 636

ANALYSIS

The third analytical approach to nonrecourse financing, developed
by the Brountas and Gibson Products courts, examines the nonrecourse
notes in the context of "production payments" as defined by section
636 of the Internal Revenue Code. Under section 636 and the corresponding Treasury regulations, a production payment represents a
right to a share of the production from a mineral in place." In addition, the right has to be an economic interest in the-mineral. 96
Confronted with the contingent nature of the nonrecourse note
and the corresponding inability to consider it a liability as long as
it remained contingent,9 7 the taxpayer in Brountas attempted to argue
that nonrecourse notes were production payments.9 8 Brountas contended that since the drilling company would receive a percentage of
the profits from the productive wells, the drilling company was receiving a production payment.9 9 The taxpayer argued that since section
636 requires all production payments to be treated as mortgage loans,
and hence liabilities, he was justified in increasing his basis by the
amount of the note.10 By interpreting section 636 in this manner,
Brountas circumvented the contingent nature of his note, thereby
avoiding its exclusion from his basis.' 0
Subsequently, courts dealt with this interpretation of section 636
in two ways. The Fifth Circuit in Gibson Products concentrated on
the correctness of the Brountas Tax Court's interpretation of the
language of that section.' 0 Conversely, the First Circuit in Brountas
acknowledged the importance of the language, but based its dismissal
current controversy over what value should be applied may prevent some courts from
basing their analysis on that decision. See Bittker, supra note 79, at 283-84.
94. See infra text accompanying note 138.
95. See supra note 46.

96. Id.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
98. Brountas, 73 T.C. at 576.
99. Id. at 562.
100. Id. at 569-71.
101. Id. at 569 n.84 ("It is for this reason that we have concluded that [the
Commissioner's] contention that these nonrecourse notes were too contingent to be
treated as liabilities was inapposite-since the notes are in reality, production payments,
they are treated as loans, regardless of whether payment is speculative.").
102. Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1049-51. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
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of the taxpayer's argument on the congressional intent underlying the
enactment of section 636.103 These two methods combine to form the

third 'analytical approach to nonrecourse financing.

The Fifth Circuit found that a nonrecourse note did not satisfy

the requirements of a production payment.'

4

The court recognized

that the note did represent a right to a specified share of the mineral
production;'10 however, the court held that the note did not constitute
an economic interest in that mineral.'0 6 The Treasury regulations
specifically state that an economic interest must be satisfied solely
from the mineral property-no additional collateral may be provided.' 7

The nonrecourse notes used by the McNeil partnership in Gibson Products were secured by additional collateral: the leaseholds and the

equipment. 0 8 Since the note did not qualify as an economic interest

in the property, the court held that it could not be a production pay-

ment and would not be treated as a mortgage loan.0 9
Although aware of this analysis," 0 the First Circuit in Brountas
concentrated on the congressional purpose in enacting section 636.
Prior to the enactment of section 636, it was thought that the taxpayer involved in an oil and gas tax shelter could secure unjustified
103. Brountas, 692 F.2d at 159-60. See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
104. Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1051.
105. Id.at 1049.
106. Id.at 1050-51. The issue of whether or not a production payment must
be totally from the production of the mineral property has not been conclusively
resolved. In Christie v. United States, 436 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit held that any alternative source of financing, even if it is only the drilling equipment, will disqualify the payment as an economic interest. But see Standard Oil Co.
(Ind.) v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d "246 (7th Cir. 1972), where the court held that
if the other collateral were economically insignificant, the payment could still qualify
as an economic interest in the mineral property. Neither Gibson Prods. nor Brountas attempted to resolve this controversy. In fact, the Tax Court in Brountas merely
acknowledged the economic interest argument and then avoided application of that
argument by claiming that the notes were substantially equivalent to production
payments and that the Treasury regulations permitted payments that are substantially equivalent to be treated as production payments. Brountas, 73 T.C. at 566-67.
107. See supra note 46 (discussing Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(a), T.D. 7261, 1973-1
C.B. 309, and the definition of production payments contained therein). See generally Berry, Production Payments- Vagueness in Regulation, 22 On. & GAs TAx Q.
51 (1973).
108. Gibson Prods., 637 F.2d at 1050.
109. Id. at 1051.
110. Brountas, 692 F.2d at 158. The First Circuit, similar to the Fifth Circuit
in Gibson Prods., discussed briefly how the nonrecourse note did not resemble a
true lending transaction. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68. The Brountas
court also discussed the definition, but did not interpret it with the same depth as
did the Gibson Prods. court. See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
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tax reductions"' by the use of pre-tax production profits to pay for
services and property."I This was illustrated in what Congress referred to as the A-B-C transaction." 3 Congress believed that by redefining a production payment in section 636 and treating it as a mortgage loan, it could eliminate the unwarranted tax benefits.'"4 Treating
the production payments as mortgage loans would allow consistent
treatment to be given to oil and gas transactions and real estate
ventures."' If, however, nonrecourse notes were held to be production payments, the intended effect of section 636 would be negated
and yet another tax advantage would have been created." 6 Thus the
111. Economic and Nonoperating Mineral Interests, 151 TAX. MoMT. (BNA)

A24-25 (1980).
112. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2216-17 [hereinafter cited as 1969 CONG. NEWS]; see also
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 140 reprinted in 1969 CONG. NEWS 1645,
1789. The Senate report acknowledged the following problems with oil and gas investments prior to the enactment of § 636.
In recent years, the use of mineral production payments was increased
substantially ....

For example, the use of production payments was almost

unknown in the coal industry several years ago. However, within recent
years, coal properties have been sold, subject to retained production payments
of approximately $800 million.
The committee agrees with the House that there is no reasonowhy a
person who, in effect, is the borrower in a production payment transaction
should be allowed to pay off the loan with tax free dollars while a borrower of funds in any other industry must satisfy the loan out of taxed
dollars.

S. REP. No. 522, supra, at 184, reprinted in 1969 CONG. NEWS at 2217.

113. The A-B-C transaction occurs when:[tlhe owner of a mineral property, A, sells it to second person, B, and
reserves a production payment (bearing interest) for a major portion of the
purchase price. He then sells the production payment to a third party, C,
which is usually a financial institution, or perhaps, a tax-exempt organization.
S. REP. No. 522, supra note 112, at 182, reprinted in 1969 CONG. NEWS at 2216.
114. See Carr Staley, Inc. v. United States, 73-2 U.S. TAX CAS. (CCH) 965
(N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963
(1975). In this case, which involved a constitutional challenge to the validity of § 636,
the court held that oil and gas taxpayers were to receive the same treatment as other
taxpayers.
115. The Senate Committee found that prior to the enactment of § 636 and
the redefinition of production payments the oil and gas taxpayer could use his profits from the wells, considered part of the production payments, to pay off his loan.
This would give the oil and gas taxpayer the use of pre-tax dollars, while taxpayers
in the real estate area would not be able to reap such a benefit. These payments
were made with after-tax dollars from rental income. S. REP. No. 552, supra note
112, at 182, reprinted in 1969 CONG. NEWS at 2216.
116. See Brountas, 692 F.2d at 160.

[1983:153]

NONRECOURSE FINANCING

First Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend nonrecourse notes
to be production payments." 7
The Brountas court continued its analysis of section 636 by stating

that the contingent nature of the nonrecourse note did not have to
be ignored if section 636 were applied." 8 Whether or not a note

qualifies as a production payment, the contingent nature of the note
is relevant. "" Application of a section 636 analysis does not preclude

the use of the "all events" test or a basis analysis.' 0 If the nonrecourse
note fails under one of these approaches, the note will not be able
to increase basis merely because it could be considered a production

payment. By continuing its analysis to this point, the Brountas court
insured that the congressional purpose of section 636 would not be
negated.

The two methods of approaching section 636 as developed in the
Brountas and Gibson Products cases provide yet another analytical

approach to prevent the taxpayer from capitalizing upon the tax
benefits generated by nonrecourse financing.
IMPLICATIONS

The decisions in Brountas and Gibson Products represent affirmative steps on the part of the First and Fifth Circuits to utilize three
analytical approaches to control and, in effect, to eliminate the use

of nonrecourse financing for oil and gas partnerships. Congress had

previously taken this step, in 1976, by enacting section 465 of the

Internal Revenue Code, commonly referred to as the "at risk"
provision.' 2 ' Under the restrictions of these provisions, a taxpayer

117. Brountas, 692 F.2d at 161. In Brountas, the Tax Court recognized that
§ 636 was enacted by Congress to eliminate unwarranted tax benefits. The court found
it ironic that their resolution of the Brountas tax problem resulted in the identification of yet another loophole in the tax laws. Brountas, 73 T.C. at 570.
118. Brountas, 692 F.2d at 161.
119. Id.

120. Id.; see also CRC Corp. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 281 (1982). the Third
Circuit noted that "[t]he essential flaw in the Tax Court's reasoning, recognized by
both courts [Gibson Prods. and Brountas], is that section 636 does not by its terms
make any changes in the rule that speculative or contingent liabilities may not be
accrued or deducted." Id. at 283.
121. I.R.C. § 465 (Supp. V 1981). See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2ND SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT OF

1976, at 62-65 (Comm. Print 1976); Shattuck, Tax Court in Brountas Rules on

Nonrecourse Financing of an Oil and Gas Tax Shelter, 53 J. TAX'N 328 (1980); R.
SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 1-69; Harrel & Stricoff, supra note 26, at 507.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

' may only declare
engaged in delineated activities 22
a loss or receive
a deduction when using borrowed funds for which the taxpayer is
personally liable.' 23 Section 465 specifically states that covered taxpayers are not "at risk" for nonrecourse notes. Application of this
section depends on the investment.'" Although within the class of
taxpayers covered by section 465, Brountas and Gibson Products were
not affected as the provisions were not retroactive.
In cases involving tax years after 1976,"2' the decisions of Brountas
and Gibson Products are of important precedential value to a court
when the taxpayer is not covered by the "at risk" provisions. By
developing the contingency arguments present in both Brountas and
Gibson Products, the Tax Court has been able to further restrict the
use of nonrecourse financing by a taxpayer in a limited partnership.
The first case in which the Tax Court was presented with a limited
partnership attempting to utilize nonrecourse financing was Graf v.
Commissioner.' 26 This case involved a foreign real estate investment
which amassed expenses for dredging services. The taxpayer paid for
the services with $10,000 in cash and a nonrecourse note for $30,000.
The Tax Court concluded that the deduction for the dredging services was too contingent. The dredging operations were required to
complete oceanfront lots, the sale of which would generate profits
from which the note was to be repaid.' 27 In a second case, Saviano
v. Commissioner,' 8 filed on the same day as Graf, the Tax Court
again found that the nonrecourse note of the taxpayer involved in
a gold claim tax shelter in Panama was too contingent to create any
deductions." 9

122. The only taxpayers covered under § 465 are those who engage in the following activities:
I. holding, producing or distributing motion picture films or video tapes;
2. farming;
3. leasing any § 1245 property;
4. exploring for, or exploiting of oil and gas resources as a trade business
or for the production of income;
5. exploring for, or exploiting, geothermal deposits.
I.R.C. § 465(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
123. Amount "at risk" is the amount of property or money invested in an
activity, funds borrowed with personal recourse and invested in the partnership activity.
Harrel & Stricoff, supra note 26, at 508.
124. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (1976) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a taxpayer shall not be considered at risk with respect to amounts protected
against loss through nonrecourse financing ...

125. See infra notes 126-30.
126. 80 T.C. 944 (1983).
127. Id.at 950-51.
128. 80 T.C. 955 (1983).
129. Id.at 962-63.

.
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Finally, presented with still another nonrecourse financing problem, the Tax Court in Fox v. Commissioner' maintained that a contingent nonrecourse note did not generate any tax advantages for the
taxpayer. The court utilized the analysis from Brountas, Gibson Products and CRC Corporation.'3 ' The Fox case involved a limited partnership whose partners attempted to include in their basis the
nonrecourse notes used to purchase publishing rights. The Tax Court
held that since the notes were to be repaid only from the sale proceeds of the book and would not be repaid if the book failed, the
notes were too contingent to be included in the taxpayer's basis.' 3 "
All three of these cases utilized the contingency arguments of
Brountas and Gibson Products to deny taxpayers not covered by the
"at risk" provisions the benefits of nonrecourse financing. These decisions have, for the most part,' 33 eliminated the tax advantages
generated by nonrecourse financing. Nonetheless, there may still exist
a few means, despite both section 465 and the courts' analyses, by
130. 80 T.C. 972 (1983).
131. Id. at 1020-23.

132. Id. at 1022.
133. Nonrecourse financing is always eliminated if the court determines that the
notes are too contingent. However, in the area of real estate, the courts have been
hesitant to declare that the notes are, in fact, contingent. A typical real estate case
treating nonrecourse debt as not contingent is Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.
340 (1966). This case involved the acquisition of a building through the use of
nonrecourse financing. The note did not have to be repaid for 99 years. The court
even found that the parties never planned on the payment of the note in that 99
year time frame. This, for all practical purposes, would appear to make the note
contingent. However, the court overlooked this defect and determined it was merely
a "bonus discount." Id. at 354.
One possible explanation for this preferential treatment is the analysis put forth
in Crane where the Supreme Court concluded that a taxpayer whose property was
of greater value than the debt would not default on his loan because of the risk
of losing his property. This was how the Court equated nonrecourse liabilities with
personal liabilities. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14. This type of analysis appears incomplete,
however. See supra note 80 for articles which discuss the problems with this analysis.
Since the Crane decision has been upheld by Tufts, it appears that such treatment
of nonrecourse financing in the real estate area has been preserved. See Tufts, 103
S. Ct. at 1831 (1983).
Nonetheless, the tax advantages of nonrecourse financing may be eliminated from
even real estate ventures if the court determines that the amount of the note
unreasonably exceeds the value of the property. The Tax Court dealt with this problem in Odendhall v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 588 (1983). In this case the Tax Court
would not permit deductions flowing from a nonrecourse note for $4 million where
the value of the property did not exceed $2 million. Hence, if the nonrecourse note
does not reflect the actual price of the property, the court will not permit even the
real estate venture to capitalize on nonrecourse financing.
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which the astute taxpayer may capitalize on the use of nonrecourse
financing.
As it currently reads, section 465 does not bar a corporation from
utilizing nonrecourse financing. As originally enacted, section 465 applied only to individual taxpayers. However, in 1978, Congress reformulated the section'34 to include corporations that meet the definition of section 542 for personal holding companies.' A problem arises
when a corporation, not covered under section 465, becomes a limited
partner in a tax shelter. The "at risk" rules are not applicable to
the corporation, presumably permitting the corporation to reap the
benefits of nonrecourse financing.' 36 However, after Brountas and Gibson Products, all taxpayers, regardless of whether or not they are
covered by the "at risk" provisions, are precluded from using the
production payments analysis. 3 7 The corporation which is a limited
partner still has the option of attacking the other analytical approaches
in order to justify the tax consequences of its nonrecourse note.
One instance where a tax benefit may still exist follows from the
basis analysis. A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court,
Tufts v. Commissioner, 8 dealt with the issue of a note secured by
property that was of less value than the face value of the note. In
dicta, the Tufts majority stated that the Crane case established that
a nonrecourse note should be treated as a loan.' 39 The impact of this
on the Brountas and Gibson Products analysis is unclear for two
reasons. First, the Court acknowledged the benefit of the Gibson Prodon whether or not it was
ucts analysis but refused to comment'
better than the Crane analysis. The Supreme Court merely accepted
the Crane analysis. Second, in its interpretation of section 752(c), which
limits the basis increase of a nonrecourse note to the fair market value
of the property it secures, the Court held that the section applied
only to sections 752(a) and (b). Similarly, the district court opinion
in Gibson Products used section 752(c) and the fair market value rule
134. I.R.C. § 465(a)(3), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 102(aXl)(A) (1980).
135. I.R.C. § 542(a)(1)(2) (1976). A personal holding company is a corporation
that has certain income treatment regulations (60% of income must belong to personal holding company) and certain ownership requirements (in the last half of the
year more than 50% of the stock is owned by five or fewer people).
136. See Baker & Berkowitz, Sheltering a CorporateInvestor, 57 TAXES 211 (1979);
Heller & Winchester, Do Nonrecouse Liabilities Qualify as Prdduction Payments?
Fifth Circuit and Tax Court Disagree, 30 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 278 (1981).
137. See supra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
138. 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
139. Id. at 1834.
140. Id. at 1832 n.8.
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to limit the amount of partnership liabilities that could be included
in basis.'" Rather than including all nonrecourse notes in basis, the
Tufts Court appeared to be accepting the district court's argument
in Gibson Products.'2 Nonetheless, since the First and Fifth Circuits
did not address the fair market value rule, it is not known whether
a subsequent court will permit a corporate limited partner to increase

its basis with a liability that was not contingent14 3 and was of a lesser
value than the fair market value of the property.
CONCLUSION

Nonrecourse financing, which is used in many tax shelters to

generate tax advantages and savings, has been severely restricted with
the enactment of section 465 and the decisions of the United States

Courts of Appeals in Gibson Products and Brountas. Those cases
illustrate the various analytical approaches a court may follow to rebut
a taxpayer's contention that nonrecourse notes have the ability to give

rise to deductions. Gibson Products and Brountas reaffirm the con-

tention that contingent nonrecourse notes do not accrue and do not
increase basis, while adding that the notes are also not to be considered production payments. The additions to the Internal Revenue
Code and the recent decisions of the courts appear to represent a
united front aimed at eliminating some of the unwarranted tax advantages present in the tax law. In light of section 465 and the three
analytical approaches available to the courts, the taxpayer/investor

141. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
143. In an unreported case from the Western District of Oklahoma, a court has
concluded that noncontingent nonrecourse notes may be included as part of the taxpayer's basis. The taxpayer put forth two arguments: first, that the Crane doctrine
permitted him to add his nonrecourse notes to basis; and second, that nonrecourse
notes are production payments. The court accepted the taxpayer's Crane argument
as he was able to show that this was a low risk investment and that not all investors
chose to utilize the available nonrecourse financing. This suggested that the investors
had confidence in the investment and helped to dispel the contingency claims. See
Dillingham v. United States, 81-2 U.S. TAX CAS. (CCH) 9601 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
Additionally, the court found that since all of the investors did not utilize the
nonrecourse financing arrangement, the value of the property must have been greater
than the value of the note. These are the same facts present in the Crane case but
not the same present in Gibson Prods. and Brountas, which involved a note of greater
value. Hence, case law would permit a qualified investor, in light of § 465 (required
to be a corporation), to capitalize on the benefits of nonrecourse financing if it can
be shown that the notes are not contingent and the property is of greater value than
the note.
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must capitalize on other benefits of tax shelters, for nonrecourse financing no longer appears to be a viable method of taking full advantage
of the tax laws.
GREGORY A. BIEGEL

